ICC EXTENSION OF THE SHREVEPORT DOCTRINE by unknown
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
vast demands on psychiatry. Thus only a few offenders might get adequate
rehabilitative therapy. A wiser approach would be to regard sex crimes as
part of the general problem of criminal deviation, and to concentrate the
limited therapeutic facilities available on those criminals, whether or not
sexually abnormal, who would benefit most from treatment. New York's
statute, because it applies only to convicted persons rather than to sexual
psychopaths as a class, may be one step in this direction. Unimplemented
this law will prove as bad as other sex offender statutes." If administered
successfully, however, it might well pioneer a significant advance in the
penal treatment of all mentally abnormal criminals.
ICC EXTENSION OF THE SHREVEPORT DOCTRINE*C
IN the course of its efforts to regulate the railroads, the Interstate Com-
merce Commission has attempted to extend its authority to include jurisdic-
tion over intrastate rates. It partly succeeded in 1914,1 when the ruling in
the Shreveport Rate Case 2 sanctioned its authority to raise these rates in
accordance with complaints by interstate shippers that the difference be-
tween inter- and intrastate rates resulted in undue preference to intrastate
shippers. Six years later, its authority to regulate intrastate commerce in the
interest of interstate commerce was enacted into Section 13 of the Inter-
state Commerce Act. 3 In addition, the Commission was authorized to hear
complaints initiated by interstate railroads as well as shippers.
4
50. For a strong condemnation of sexual psychopath laws see Deutsch, Sober Facts:
About Sex Crime, Colliers, Nov. 25, 1950, p. 15.
* Docket No. 30455, decided July 31, 1950.
1. For a history of attempts prior to 1914, see Coleman, The Evolution of Federat
Regudation of Intrastate Rates: The Shreveport Rate Cases, 28 HARv. L. Rav. 34 (1914).
2. Houston & Texas Ry. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914).
3. Interstate Commerce Act §§ 13(3), 13(4), 49 U.S.C. §§ 13(3), 13(4) (1946), added
by Transportation Act of Feb. 28, 1920,41 STAT. 484 (1920).
§ 13(4) reads as follows:
"Whenever in any such investigation the commission, after full hearing, finds that any
such rate, fare, charge, classification, regulation, or practice causes any undue or unreason-
able advantage, preference, or prejudice as between persons or localities in intrastate com-
merce on the one hand and interstate or foreign commerce on the other hand, or any undue,
unreasonable, or unjust discrimination against interstate or foreign commerce, which is.
hereby forbidden and declared to be unlawful, it shall prescribe the rate, fare, or charge,
or the maximum or minimum, or maximum and minimum, thereafter to be charged, and
the classification, regulation, or practice thereafter to be observed, in such manner as, in its.
judgment, will remove such advantage, preference, prejudice, or discrimination. Such rates?
fares, charges, classifications, regulations, and practices, shall be observed while in effect
by the carriers parties to such proceeding affected thereby, the law of any State or the deci-
sion or order of any State authority to the contrary notwithstanding."
4. § 13(3), see note 3 supra, gave the railroads as well as shippers and others affected
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Most Section 13 proceedings are in fact brought by railroads.5 They
typically arise as follows: after the ICC has granted interstate increases in
a large section of the country, the railroads in the area affected petition the
states for comparable intrastate increases. After hearings and decisions by
the state commissions, the railroads, if dissatisfied, complain to the ICC.8
A recent ICC decision, Alabama Intrastate Rates and Charges T95o,7
represents an important departure from this procedure. The railroads filed
rate schedules with the Alabama commission requesting general intrastate
increases. Their petition was rejected on procedural grounds, with in-
structions to refile and request a hearing on the merits. Without waiting
for further state action, the railroads applied for Section 13 relief." The
ICC, over protests from Alabama and from intrastate shippers,9 issued an
the right to attack state-imposed rates. § 13(3) is as follows: "Whenever in any investiga-
tion under the provisions of this chapter, or in any investigation instituted upon petition
of the carrier concerned, which petition is authorized to be fried, there shall be brought in issue
any rate, fare, charge, classification, regulation, or practice, made or imposed by authority
of any State, the commission, before proceeding to hear and dispose of such issue, shall
cause the State or States interested to be notified of the proceeding. The commission may
confer with the authorities of any State having regulatory jurisdiction over the class of
persons and corporations subject to this chapter or chapter 12 of this title with respect to
the relationship between rate structures and practices or carriers subject to the jurisdiction
of such State bodies and of the commission; and to that end is authorized and empowered,
under rules to be prescribed by it, and which may be modified from time to time, to hold
joint hearings with any such State regulating bodies on any matters wherein the commission
is empowered to act and where the rate-making authority of a State is or may be affected
by the action taken by the commission. The commission is also authorized to avail itself
of the cooperation, services, records, and facilities of such State authorities in the enforce-
ment of any provision of this chapter or chapter 12 of this title." [Emphasis added.]
Prior to the 1920 statute, railroads had no standing to challenge intrastate rates before
the ICC. The railroads in the Shreveport Case defended existing intrastate rates. Houston
& Texas Ry. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914). The ICC in that case was given the
power to regulate intrastate rates under § 3(1) of the Act, 49 U.S.C. § 3(1) (1929), 24 STAT.
380 (1887), amended, 41 STAT. 479 (1920); 234 U.S. 342, 355 et. seg. (1914). § 3(1) provides
that "[i]t shall be unlawful for any common carrier . . . to make, give, or cause any undue
or unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular person, company, firm, corpora-
tion, .... locality. . . ..." This section was clearly directed against the carriers themselves,
rather than against any state authority. 234 U.S. 342,356.
5. Of 150 cases involving intrastate rate changes between September 1927 and Jan-
uary 1938, listed in LUST, CONSOLIDATED DIGEST OF DEcISIONS UNDER THE INTERSTATE
ColERcE AcT, vols. 5-9 (1931, 1933, 1936, 1938, 1941), including applications for modifi-
cations of previous decisions, railroads initiated 106.
6. E.g., Texas Intrastate Rates, 273 I.C.C. 749 (1949); Increases in Kansas Freight
Rates and Charges, 231 I.C.C. 137 (1938); Arkansas Rates and Fares, 59 I.C.C. 471 (1920).
7. Docket No. 30455, decided July 31, 1950.
8. Id. at 17 (dissenting opinion).
9. Id. at 12-14.
The Alabama commission had rejected the proposed rate increases on the ground that
they were filed improperly, and argued before the ICC that there had been no attempt by
the railroads to secure a decision by the state, and that therefore the state had been de-
prived of an opportunity to decide the case. In its brief, the state commission also argued
on the merits.
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-order requiring that intrastate rates be raised at least to the equivalent
interstate level.10
In asserting its power to issue this order before a prior decision by the
state, the ICC relied upon Florida v. United States." There, the Com-
mission had ordered log rates within Florida to be raised to the interstate
level in order to prevent undue prejudice to Georgia shippers. On appeal
to the Supreme Court, Florida argued, among other things, that it had not
yet had an opportunity to rule upon the lawfulness of the intrastate rates.
Although ruling in favor of Florida, the Court rejected this contention,
stating that such action by the state was unnecessary.'
2
The Florida case is an incomplete analogy. There it was interstate ship-
pers from Georgia who were attacking the Florida rates. In that situation,
the sole ground on which any attack can be made is prejudice to interstate
commerce, a question not within the jurisdiction of a state commission.
When, however, as in the Alabama case, the complainant is a railroad
Intrastate shippers opposing the changes included cotton dealers, a nylon garments
-fabricator, and representatives of a number of commercial firms at Montgomery. Id. at 13.
The total intrastate tonnage affected by the decision was estimated to be 164,981 tons,
which constituted 39% of Alabama's total shipping interstate and intrastate. Nearly a
quarter of this consisted of intrastate shipping of mine products. Id. at 6.
10. With the exception of commodities withdrawn from consideration by the railroad.
"d. at 15-16. These commodities were: sulphuric acid, brick, canned goods, asphaltic lime-
stone, petroleum and its products, cast iron pipe, road aggregates, road building material,
roofing, and expanded slag. No reason for the railroad's action with respect to these com-
modities is given in the opinion, but it is possible that competition with motor and water
carriers influenced their decision.
11. 282 U.S. 194 (1931).
The ICC also cited three of its own cases, which are listed in note 6 supra. The Texas
rase is closest to the Alabama decision. There the state commission had held hearings, but
had not had the opportunity to rule on certain of the commodities involved in the Section
13 application. The ICC, stating that the interests of Texas would not be injured by its
inability to rule on them, cited Florida v. United States and ordered all of the rates to be
raised.
In neither of the other two cases cited by the ICC was the state commission in fact
deprived of an opportunity for a hearing and decision. In the Kansas case, the protest was
that the railroads had not exhausted their state remedies since they had not applied for a
rehearing. In contrast to the Alabama case, the Kansas commission had already held an
initial hearing on the requested rate increases and had rendered a decision. In the Arkansas
case, the state protested that state remedies had not been exhausted because the railroads
had not applied to the state courts to suspend a controlling statute. The ICC, stating that
the state commission had already ruled on the case to the extent of its powers, overruled
the objection.
12. "To hold, as some of the appellants urge, that there can be no adjustment of intra-
state rates by the Interstate Commerce Commission so far as may be needed to protect inter-
state commerce until the State itself has first 'sat in judgment on the issue of the lawfulness
,of those intrastate rates' would be to impose a limitation not required by the'terms of the
statute and repugnant to the grant of authority." 282 U.S. 194, 210. The sentence here
quoted concludes the Court's refutation of appellants' argument that because the state had
not "made or imposed" the rates in question, but had simply permitted them to go into
effect, the ICC had no power to change the rates.
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operating within the state, an original attack on the intrastate rates can
be made in the state commission on the ground that the rates are unreason-
ably low, so that the railroad is unable to make a fair return.
13
Section 13 itself makes no mention of prior state hearings. It authorizes
cooperation with the states in matters which affect their interests, 14 and
prescribes the criteria which the ICC is to apply in deciding intrastate rate
cases.' 5 The words and legislative history of the statute indicate that Con-
gress intended to implement the federal power to prevent injury to interstate
commerce, and at the same time, to preserve the state power over intrastate
rates to the extent possible.' 6 Therefore, a determination of the legality
under the statute of the ICC's procedure in the Alabama case should
depend upon a balancing of necessity to interstate commerce against the
resulting loss to the states. 
7
The Alabama decision will prevent consideration of all of the possible
consequences of changing intrastate rates. The ICC is limited in its
deliberations solely to the- question of harmful effects on interstate com-
merce.' Specifically, it may examine the rates only to determine if they
13. State statutes typically require that intrastate rates be "just and reasonable."
This phrase includes, either by statutory or judicial amplification, the idea that the rail-
roads are entitled to a fair return. See, e.g., ALA. CODE, tit. 48, § 52 (1940); N.Y. PuB.
SERV. LAW, Art. 3, § 49 (1938); 1 PAGE'S Omo GEN. CODE ANN. § 504 (1946); Railroad v.
Pub. Util. Corn., 160 O.S. 120, 155 N.E. 862 (1927).
When the railroads petition the ICC for rate increases on the grounds of unjust dis-
crimination against interstate commerce, they are, in effect, asserting that they are not
making a fair return on the intrastate portion of their traffic. See note 20 infra.
14. Interstate Commerce Act § 13 (3). See note 4 supra.
15. Interstate Commerce Act § 13(4). See note 3 supra.
16. See H.R. REP. No. 456, 66th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1919); H.R. REP. No. 650, 66th
Cong., 2d Sess. 64-65(1920); MAcVEAGH, THE TRANSPORTATION AcT, 1920, 314 et seq.
(1923).
17. The Supreme Court has long been attempting to balance state and federal powers
over railroad rates. In the Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352 (1913), the Court upheld
the power of a state to set intrastate rates against the attack of the railroads that the rela-
tionship between these and interstate rates resulted in inevitable discrimination against in-
terstate commerce. In the Shreveport Rate Case, 234 U.S. 342 (1914), it upheld the power of
the ICC to protect against preference and prejudice in favor of intrastate shippers. North
Carolina v. United States, 325 U.S. 507 (1945), contains a recent discussion of this problem.
There, the Court states that the primary power rests with the states; the right of the ICC
to interfere depends upon clear and certain findings that the prohibited degree of prejudice
or discrimination has been reached, a point "not always easy to mark." Id. at 511.
It follows that the damage to interstate commerce must be substantial and clearly
shown before the Commission has the power to act. In the situation presented in the
Alabama case, a showing that the action taken was necessary to prevent serious harm to
interstate commerce would justify such action. On the other hand, a showing that the state
has been harmed by the procedure followed, and that interstate commerce could have been
protected by a different procedure, would serve to reverse the decision.
18. From the Shreveport Rate Case, 234 U.S. 342, (1914) and from the Minnesota
Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352 (1913), it is clear that the Commission is limited in its power over
intrastate commerce to the protection of interstate commerce. See also North Carolina v.
United States, 325 U.S. 507, 511 (1945); American Express Co. v. Caldwell, 244 U.S. 617,
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cause "undue prejudice" to "persons and localities in interstate commerce"
or "unjust discrimination" to it.19 Undue prejudice exists when an intrastate
rate for a specific commodity, or to and from a specific locality, is so far
'below the interstate level that shipments from outside the state are econom-
ically impossible. Unjust discrimination exists when the general level of all
rates within a state is so low that intrastate revenues are insufficient to
cover the allocable costs and charges.2" Consideration of the economic
effects within the state of the proposed rate changes, which is beyond the
scope of the ICC's inquiry, is the prerogative of the state commission.21
But the procedure followed in the Alabama case precludes the possibility of
any such consideration.
The creation of this jurisdictional no-man's land will damage the state
and its citizens in several ways. The absence of a state hearing may make
:impossible both a reasoned decision by the state commission as to what
rates are desirable, and an effective argument in support of those rates before
the ICC. Only through a hearing can the state commission obtain neces-
,sary information concerning (1) intrastate railroad costs and revenues, and
(2) the effect on the state's economy which a rate change will produce.
2 2
Furthermore, the extensive and specialized knowledge required to argue
Section 13 cases means that a state commission is often the only body capa-
'ble of presenting adequately the case for the interests within the state.2 3
625-26 (1917). The ICC itself has recognized this limitation: "[I]n every case which puts
in question intrastate rates, the decisive factor is whether or not they affect interstate
,commerce injuriously to a considerable extent." Rates, Fares, and Charges of N.Y.C. R.R.
Co., 59 I.C.C. 290, 292 (1920).
19. Interstate Commerce Act § 13(4), see note 3 sup ra.
20. For discussions indicating the distinction between prejudice and discrimination,
-see North Carolina v. United States, 325 U.S. 507, 512 et seg. (1945); Wis. R.R. Comm.
v. Chicago, B. & Q. RR Co., 257 U.S. 563 (1922); Rates, Fares, and Charges of N.Y.C. R.R.
Co., 59 I.C.C. 290 (1920).
As these cases indicate, to prove prejudice it is necessary to show that the differential
between specific rates is such that interstate shippers are impeded economically because of
the unfair competition. To prove discrimination, which involves the general rate structure,
it is necessary to show that the railroad is incapable of making a fair return on its intrastate
traffic, and that the intrastate traffic is not contributing its fair share of the earnings re-
quired to meet maintenance and operating costs. See North Carolina v. United States,
325 U.S. 507, 520 (1945).
21. See, e.g., Anchor Storage Co. v. Alton R. Co., 211 I.C.C. 307, 309 (1935) (ICC has
no authority to prevent discrimination to intrastate commerce).
See also, e.g., ALA. CODE, tit. 48, § 117, (1940) which provides that special rates may be
set for the transportation of specific commodities in order to aid in the development or
-continuation of industrial and agricultural enterprises.
22. See note 13 supra.
23. The determination as to whether intrastate revenues are sufficient to support
allocable costs and charges is so complex as to lead to a reorganization-like wonderland of
more or less educated guesswork and statistical manipulation. It involves intricate account-
ing analysis to attempt to segregate intra- from interstate revenues and costs, and con-
siderable experience to determine, for example, whether higher rates will aid the railroads
by increasing their revenues, or whether lower rates, by increasing the volume of business,
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Adherence to the procedure followed in the Alabama case would sub-
stantially impede the setting of rates which are neither unduly harmful to
interstate commerce nor as high as interstate rates. Both the Court and the
ICC. have said that such intrastate rates may exist.24 But the ICC may
consider only the interests of interstate commerce. 25 For a fair solution to
any rate differential problem, two questions must be answered: (1) whether
interstate commerce is in fact being injured, and (2) to what extent rates
must be changed to remove the injury. So far, if injury is found, the response
of the ICC. has always been to equalize the rates.2 But even if it dis-
continued this practice, the state commission, which has been prevented
from making a prior attempt to mediate between inter- and intrastate in-
terests, would be hampered by lack of facts from arguing for the most de-
sirable possible adjudication.
When rates on commodities which move in intra- but not in interstate
commerce within the state are regulated, the same considerations apply.
Here there is no question of undue prejudice since there are no shipments
from without the state in any case.27 But allegations of unjust discrimina-
will actually produce a greater margin between revenues and costs. Similarly, considerable
knowledge and experience is required to determine if rate differentials are in fact the cause
of reduced interstate shipments, or whether other factors would in any event prevent com-
petition. This whole range of arguments has always been a legal necessity under the Section
13 standards, recently reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in the North Carolina case. See
North Carolina v. United States, 325 U.S. 507, 520 (1945). The state commission has the
facilities for obtaining needed data from the railroads, and the experience and expert
knowledge required to interpret this data. Intrastate shippers may find it economically
or actually impossible to prepare arguments strong enough to match those of the railroads.
The volume of intrastate movement may be large. In 1944, for example, intrastate
freight revenues within Texas amounted to $87,798,436, as compared with interstate rev-
enues of $214,392,780. Total intrastate revenues in that year were $118,213,008, and total
interstate revenues were $294,618,085. RAILROAD STAlisncAL SEcnON OF THE FiFTm-
TruRD ANNUAL REPORT OF THE RAILROAD COMImssION OF TExAS, FOR T YEAR 1944.
For statistics on the Alabama intrastate shipping affected by the instant case, see note 9
supra.
24. North Carolina v. United States, 325 U.S. 507, 512-514 (1945) (low intrastate
passenger fare not prejudicial; no showing of discrimination; ICC reversed); Emergency
Freight Charges Within Idaho, 213 I.C.C. 130, 131-32 (1935) (mere disparity between intra-
and interstate freight rates not sufficient to show Section 13 violation; state rates upheld).
25. See note 18 supra.
26. A possible reason for this policy is that equalizing the rates is certain to protect
interstate commerce, and until the Alabama decision the state always had an opportunity to
attempt a compromise solution. There is little doubt that the Commission would have the
power to set rates so as to achieve a compromise solution itself. In fact, § 13(4) authorizes it
to set maximum and minimum rates, so that it might define the area of non-discrimination
and permit the states to set rates within those limits. However, the Commission is not pri-
marily concerned with the interests of intrastate commerce or of the states; it is not the
agency best equipped to decide what those interests are. Furthermore, because only effects
upon interstate commerce are within its jurisdiction, there might be considerable difficulty
obtaining the information required to achieve a compromise solution if the state were
precluded from obtaining it at a prior hearing.
27. See text at note 20 supra.
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tion may arise. Absent a chance to hold a hearing, the state would have no
opportunity to set the general level of intrastate rates high enough to over-
come such allegations and at the same time to keep these selected rates as
low as possible.
The damage to the state from the ICC's decision in this case far out-
weighs the advantage to interstate commerce, which consists entirely of the
monetary gain to the railroads resulting from the time saved in by-passing
the state commissions. Putting the new rates into effect several months
earlier might result in a saving to the railroads of several million dollars.
Because the increase in revenue during these months comes largely from
within the state, however, the gain to the railroads is at the expense of intra-
state shippers.28 Shifting the burden of this expense from the railroads to
the intrastate shippers could be justified only on the assumption that the
by-passing of the state commission would make no difference in the final
determination of rates. As pointed out above, this assumption seems invalid.
On the other hand, the delay of which the railroads complain can largely
be removed without any impairment of state powers. From the point of
view of railroad revenues, the important Section 13 cases result from prior
general interstate increases. If, at the same time they applied for interstate
increases, the railroads filed intrastate increase applications with the ap-
propriate states, the states should be able to complete their investigations
by the time the ICC handed down its decision. They would then have only
to relate their decision to that of the Commission. Since representatives
from the commissions of all states involved are invited to attend the ICC's
general increase hearings in an advisory capacity,29 state officials will be
already familiar with both the federal and the state situations. Therefore,
the step of relating their decision to that of the ICC should take little time.
The delay between the ICC's decision on interstate rates and its reception
of Section 13 complaints would therefore be short, and the loss to the rail-
roads correspondingly small. The ICC could enforce this procedure by re-
fusing to hear complaints until there has been a state hearing if a railroad
has failed to make timely application to the state commission. On the other
hand, if the railroad has filed such timely application, the ICC should act
promptly regardless of whether the state commission has availed itself of
the opportunity to hold an early hearing.
28. If the volume of inter- and intrastate traffic remains the same, intrastate ship-
ments assume the total burden of the rate increases. If equalizing the rates results in an
increase in interstate traffic at the expense of intrastate shipments, intrastate shippers lose
as a result both of rate increases and of decline in business. If the increase in rates diverts
traffic away from the railroads, the railroads may suffer such a diminution in total revenues
as to be impelled to restore the prior low rates.
29. See Lindahl, Cooperation Between the Interstate Commerce Commission and the State
Commissions in Railroad Regulation, 33 MicH. L. REv. 338, 368-69 (1935). See also Co-
operative Agreement, Procedure Recommended, I.C.C. ANNUAL REPORT 275 et seg. (1925).
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